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1. Introduction
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In most developed countries, the financial sector has seen a growth in employment, value
added, visibility and power. Some authors call this phenomenon financialisation (Epstein,
2005), which is characterised by features such as (i) a large development of financial
markets, (ii) de-regulation of the financial system and of the economy in general, (iii) the
emergence of new financial institutions and markets, (iv) and the appearance of a culture
oriented to the individual, the market and rationalism.
Some authors see the growth of finance and financial deregulation as essentially beneficial
given that the financial sector stimulates economic growth and financial markets guide the
efficient allocation of resources (e.g. IMF, 2006:51). For example, securitisation allows risk
to be spread to institutions that are better equipped to deal with it.
In contrast, the literature on financialisation highlights the negative consequences of that
phenomenon, such as: firms aim to maximise their short-run financial value at the cost of
sustainable productive investments; economic and social public policies are pushed into
accepting market mechanisms in all areas of life, sometimes with deleterious
consequences for efficiency and equity; and growing areas of economic and social life are
exposed to the volatility and crises that often characterise financial markets.
This paper is concerned with the implications of both visions of finance for risk
management. The mainstream view argues that as finance grows, risk management
becomes more efficient and therefore ensures the diversification and control of risk. When
divided and packaged into securities, risk is diversified and reduced. In contrast, the
financialisation approach is sceptical about the financial sector's capacity to manage risk
effectively. As finance expands and new financial institutions and markets emerge, the
pressure for short-run profit and growth, and the deregulation of financial markets leads to
more risk and ultimately to crises. Firms tend to ignore their long-run survival and other
social values.
We review the literature to assess the role of risk management in the Subprime crisis in
order to conclude which of the two aforementioned visions prevails. It should be noted that
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the simple fact a crisis has occurred does not mean necessarily that the mainstream view
is wrong. Even if risk management is perfectly executed, great losses may be incurred due
to bad luck or to unforeseeable risks.
The financial literature provides no single definition of risk management. In one of the
broadest definitions, risk management is defined as the identification and management of a
corporation’s exposure to financial risk (Kaen, 2005).
Due to the strong development of financial products and services in the last years, risk
management gained a great prominence in most financial corporations. Voinea and Anton
(2009) point out that risk management has become more used in the beginning of the
nineties, due to the increased volatility of international financial markets, financial
innovations (namely, the emergence of new financial derivatives), the growing role played
by financial products in the process of financial intermediation, and the substantial losses
incurred by corporations without sophisticated risk management systems. According to the
authors, many of the most famous corporate losses of the 1990s (Enron and WorldCom,
Orange County, Barings bank, among others) could have been avoided if corporations
followed good risk management practices.
When analysing risk, it is useful to classify it into four types according to the level of
knowledge and uncertainty: “Known Knowns”, “Known Unknowns”, “Unknown Unknowns”,
Unknowns Knowns - Table 1 (Jorion, 2009; Hughes, nd). In the first category, risks are
correctly identified and measured, the distribution of total profits and losses is well
recognised. However, losses can occur due to the combination of bad luck or due to
excessive exposure. In the second category (“Known Unknowns”) risks are correctly
identified, but they are measured inaccurately. The third category (“Unknown Unknowns”)
contemplates risks that are not considered in most scenarios because they are simply
unknown. Finally, the last category (“Unknowns Knowns”) encompasses the risks that were
forgotten. The major room of manoeuvre for improvement in risk management is in the
categories “Known Unknowns” and, especially, “Unknown Knowns”.
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Beyhaghi and Hawley (2011) add that financial institutions can face four groups of different
risks: market, credit, liquidity, and operational. Market risk results from the effect on
portfolios of unexpected market fluctuations. Credit risk is associated to the likelihood of a
counterparty failing to repay its obligation to the financial institution. Liquidity risk is
related to the possibility that a financial institution will be unable to sell an investment
without incurring a significant cost, or the risk of being unable to finance current operations
in the market. Finally, operational risk is linked to losses arising from operational
inadequacies within the organisation resulting from failures in processes, people, technical
systems and/or fraudulent activities. These authors warn that the complexity of the
investment world and the diversity of financial products and services have hampered the
accurate identification of all risks by financial institutions.
Table 1 – Risk categories
Category Meaning Examples
Known Knowns Risks we know about now and can
predict and quantify with
reasonable accuracy now
Current Volatility
Short-term inflation
Secular demographic factors
Expected default rates
Known Unknowns Risks we know about now, but
cannot predict the timing of and/or
quantify accurately now
Corporation/industry demise
Long-term inflation
Changes in consumer tastes
Actual default rates
Unknown Knowns Risks we forgot we knew about Risks associated with universal
banking
Portfolio correlations in bear
markets
Unknown Unknowns Risks we cannot know about now Terrorist attacks of September 11
Madoff fraud
Arab uprisings 2011
Source: Based on Hughes (nd)
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Most corporations used the Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodology to measure the risk of losses
on a specific portfolio of financial assets (market risk). Indeed, for a certain portfolio,
probability and time horizon, VaR is defined as a threshold value (e.g., in euros) such that
the probability that the market-to-market loss on the portfolio over the given time horizon
exceeds that value is the defined probability level (normally 5% or 1%, assuming normal
distribution and no trading in the portfolio).
According to Stulz (2009), the role of risk management is to identify, monitor and manage
the risks faced by a corporation, and to communicate them to senior management (and/or
to the Board of Directors). He adds that the main role of risk management is to ensure that
top management knows and understands the probabilities associated with possible
outcomes of the corporation’s strategy before it makes decisions to commit capital.
Lang and Jagtiani (2010) consider that models of modern risk management should
guarantee three features. Firstly, they should take into account the unexpected losses, as
well as accurately measure the expected losses. Secondly, they must view all risks in a
portfolio perspective, taking into account correlations among assets and the concentration
of exposures to common risk factors. Thirdly, they should develop measures of “tail risk”
for assessing capital’s needs.
Voinea and Anton (2009) note that there are two different approaches to the risk
management process: the traditional and the Enterprise Risk Management (ERM). In the
traditional approach, risk is segmented and compartmentalised, different risks are
delegated to specialised employees who use specific instruments to tackle them. In the
ERM approach, all risks are assembled in a strategic and coordinated framework and a
specific entity has a general view of risk.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the origin of the
Subprime crisis. Section 3 addresses the main risk management failures occurred during
the crisis, and Section 4 puts forward the lessons and recommendations that can be drew
from the analysis of those failures. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Origin of the Crisis
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In this section, we address the causes of the crisis to contextualise the failures in risk
management. In the end of 2007, the international economy was hit by the collapse of the
subprime credit segment in the US. Several factors contributed to this crisis. During the
first years of the new millennium and after the ‘dot.com’ bubble, economic robustness, low
interest rates, political pressures to promote house ownership, lower construction costs,
population growth, and low risk awareness of consumers and financial institutions,
favoured the increase of loans to high-risk households in the US. These households were
unable to meet normal credit and/or documentation requirements for ordinary mortgages;
they became known as NINJA loans (borrowers with “no income, no job and no assets”).
These loans were fundamentally short-term and could be re-negotiated depending on the
valuation of the property, with an increase in the house’s price allowing an increase in the
loan. There was a practice of aggressive lending by many banks, which granted credits at
predatory rates to those who were not in a comfortable position to honour their obligations
over time (Rötheli, 2010).
For banking institutions, the subprime credit segment was quite profitable due to its high
interest rates. The rapid growth of that credit segment was driven by the need of banks to
increase profits and the securitisation process. On the one hand, banks were pressured by
financial markets to raise profits, since share prices depend on the growth of dividends.
Therefore, financial institutions used the relatively unexplored subprime segment to
increase their profits.
On the other hand, US banking institutions bundled the subprime mortgages into portfolios
and repackaged them in tranches of different risk classes and returns (see Figure 1),
through securitisation operations using new financial instruments (Asset Backed Securities
(ABS), Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Commercial MBS or Collateralised
Debt Obligation (CDO)).1 In a strategy of risk immunisation and diversification and in order
1 ABSs correspond to securities whose value and income payments are derived from and
collateralized (or “backed”) by a specified pool of underlying assets. The pool of assets is typically a group of
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to obtain financing (in a context of low savings and deposits), US banking institutions sold
these products all around the world to banks, mutual funds, pension funds, and state
institutions, among others. Investors from many countries were attracted by these
securities, given their high returns and good ratings. This process is commonly referred to
as the originate-to-distribute model. The idea was that by dividing risk and packaging it in
securities, the overall risk would be diversified. This proved a mistake and facilitated the
worldwide spread of the crisis (Crotty, 2009), also eased by the growing international
integration of financial markets.
The mortgage market became financialised and increasingly facilitated financial global
investments (Aalbers, 2008). Instead of focusing on easing households financing, this
market was used to transfer money to the financial sector. The subprime market was
busted by the use of credit scoring, risk-based pricing and securitisation, allowing risky
loans to be seen as a way of getting high yields, instead of something to be avoided. The
techniques to assess risk and the large apparent liquidity of ABS market lead to the
explosion of mortgage and consumer credit in general (Langley, 2008). The excess risk
taking by financial institutions meant that the long-term sustainability of the financial
accumulation was threatened.
Through securitisation, US banks removed credit risk from their balance sheets, creating
an incentive for generating more credit regardless of its quality. Lang and Jagtiani (2010)
claim that the originate-to-distribute model allowed converting illiquid loans into liquid
securities, reducing the incentives of mortgage originators to carefully screen borrowers.
Because bank managers were being remunerated by the short-run performance of banks,
small and illiquid assets that are unable to be sold individually. Residential MBSs consists in securities whose
cash flows come from residential debt such as mortgages, home-equity loans and subprime mortgages.
Commercial MBSs are mortgage-backed securities secured by the loan on a commercial property. CDOs are
ABSs backed by a portfolio of fixed-income assets, typically split into different risk classes, or tranches.
Interest and principal payments are made in order of seniority, so that junior tranches offer higher coupon
rates. For simplicity we will refer only to ABS.
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they were not really concerned with the quality of what they were selling to customers
(Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011).
Figure 1 – The process of subprime lending
Source: Based on Gupta et al. (2010)
Nelson and Katzenstein (2011) emphasise that the rise of house prices and the low
mortgages default rate in the preceding years were crucial for banks to aggressively
pursue a strategy of securitisation and for investors to snap up these securitised products.
Moreover, participants in this market expected that the expressive growth in house prices
would continue unabated in the coming years. The existence of a nationwide crisis in the
house market was a rare event in US history of the twentieth century, and market
participants were anticipated at most a regional fall in house prices. With strong growth in
house prices, even if some families defaulted, banks could sell the house to pay the
mortgage without any loss. Lang and Jagtiani (2010) refers that the bursting of the housing
market bubble was one important explanation for the crisis.
Crotty (2009) emphasises that the demand for securitised products was strong not only due
to the upward trend in the housing market, but also due to the fact that buyers could
borrow money cheaply, returns were high and the products had high credit ratings.
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Accordingly, credit rating agencies also played an important role in this process, providing
very positive credit ratings (at the level of investment grade) to MBSs or CDOs (Lang and
Jagtiani, 2010), which according to Crotty (2009) were illiquid, non-transparent and too
complex. In many cases, credit rating agencies certified these products with the status of
“triple-A” rating. White (2009) suggests that favourable ratings were important for at least
two reasons. Firstly, it meant that financial products could more readily be bought by
institutional investors, who were governed by strict internal rules of minimum credit
ratings for their investments. Secondly, due to high ratings, buyers trusted the products
they were buying, despite their returns were higher than comparably rated corporate
bonds.
Gupta et al. (2010) also emphasise that very often the structuring and issuance of these
products was done together by investment banks and credit rating agencies, leading to
“moral hazard” by the latter. It would be difficult for those agencies to assign a low rating
for a product that they had helped to design. The authors further suggest that credit rating
agencies made huge profits with these structured products, which was a big incentive for
them to collaborate in the success of those products. Moreover, if one agency had given a
more realistic low rating to these securitised products, while others had not, it would had
lower profits than their competitors (Crotty, 2009).
Kirkpatrick (2009) adds that the large volume of ratings assigned by credit rating agencies
originated an expressive commercial pressure to meet the needs of customers and to
undertake credit ratings rapidly. This pressure led to poor assessments by rating agencies,
with the majority of them based on insufficient historical data.
Good ratings helped to increase the demand for CDOs. However, some investment banks
retained part of the subprime structured products on their balance sheets, especially the
super-senior tranches of CDOs (with lower interest rates). Banks earned a generous
income retaining the CDOs, since these products paid high interest rates and were financed
with money market funds at low interest rates (Kashyap, 2010). Such a strategy was highly
profitable also because the yield curve was positively sloped.
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That excessive maturity transformation was mentioned by Hellwig (2008) as an important
systematic risk factor. According to Kashyap (2010), the breakdown of incentives and risk
control systems were the main factors that contributed to this strategy. Hellwig (2008)
argues that the large engagement of banks in that maturity game is related to the fact that
investments were done through conduits and Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs), which
were separate legal entities. This lead banks to underestimate their commitment to deliver
liquidity to those ventures. Banks were giving support to these vehicles but did not affect
any capital for that purpose. The larger risk was in conduits that earned profits from
holding assets, whereas SIVs profited from the sale of assets.
Crotty (2009) points five other reasons that explain why banks kept subprime ABSs in their
portfolios. First, they maintained them to persuade potential investors that these products
were safe. Second, they retained them because they could hold these products off-balance-
sheet without further capital reserve requirements. Third, they kept them due to the scant
regulation, in a context where regulators also believed on the hypothesis that these
products could be sold quickly. Fourth, they preserved them to maintain sales dynamism in
periods where was difficult to sell the safest and senior tranches. Finally, they held them
due to bankers’ incentive to generate high profits in the short-run, despite the high risk
involved.
Acharya and Richardson (2009) still argue that most of banks retained the subprime ABSs
because they yielded high profits and required small amounts of capital, as some were hold
off-balance sheet. The overall perception that these products had a low risk, as proved by
the high ratings, also favoured their retention by investment banks.
Banks used high levels of leverage to constitute portfolios, making them very vulnerable to
any slight change in the price of securities. It is clear that the increase in leverage was
potentiated by mortgage securitisation (Adrian and Shin, 2010). Capital ratios decreased to
very low levels, without proper action from regulatory authorities (Larosière et al, 2009).
The Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) (2009) adds that the excessive leverage and reliance on
short-term funding were the result of risk governance weaknesses, misaligned incentives,
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incomplete risk management reports, limitations or unintended consequences of
regulatory requirements and ineffective market discipline, as we will see in more detail
latter.
In the Introduction we saw that the financialisation of the economy incentivises firms to
increase debt. Investment banks were not as exception, as they look to pay fewer taxes by
using debt rather than equity and increase leverage to magnify return on equity (Palley,
2007).
The systemic risk was also increased by the procyclicality introduced in the system by
credit ratings, margin calls, and CDSs spreads (Turner, 2009). For instance, the increase in
securitisation meant that investors were increasingly trusting in simple rules based on
ratings (e.g. hold only investment grade bonds), which increased the risk of simultaneous
sell by several of them.
Voinea and Anton (2009) also recognise many of the factors referred to above as
responsible for the crisis, namely the boom of the real estate market in the US, the
increased innovation in financial products and services, and their growing complexity
(which allowed the transfer of risks associated with mortgage loans via securitisation), and
financial market speculation (e.g. predatory lending practices). They add that other
elements have also played an important role in the crisis, particularly the inappropriate
mechanisms of regulation and supervision of international financial markets, the
increasing intricacy of financial systems, and poor risk management practices.
Furthermore, Rötheli (2010) claims that there are several explanations for this crisis.
Firstly, he criticises the monetary policy steered by the Federal Reserve (Fed) since 2002.
According to him, the Fed fixed the federal funds interest rates markedly below the
predictions of the Taylor Rule, which illustrates that the US monetary policy was too
expansionary during that time. After 2001, the Federal Reserve was concerned with the
deflationary effect of the bursting of the ‘dot-com’ bubble. In this regard, Foo (2008) also
reiterates that the extraordinary cycle of low interest rates in the Greenspan’s era was
determinant for the overheating of the US housing market.
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Secondly, he refers that the sophistication, complexity and globalisation of financial
markets played a central role. Thirdly, he points that one important element in the crunch
was the “credit cycle”, which describes the tendency to excessively increase credit supply
during expansions and to decrease it excessively during recessions. He adds that in the
years preceding the Subprime crisis, most banks lent at low interest rates and with lax
terms, taking excessive risks due to over-optimism. This excessive lending was fed by the
behaviour of younger professionals (who tend to underestimated the risk of default), the
existence of compensation schemes that related bankers’ bonuses to short term profits of
banks, and the strong competition between banks that lead to riskier lending in order to
gain market share and increase profits (this opinion is shared by Nelson and Katzenstein,
2011; and Ashby, 2010).
The growth of credit was also fostered by the large availability of funds that financed
directly banks on the markets and increased the demand for securitised products. The
abundance of funds is related with two factors. On the one hand, there was a long-term
tendency characterised by the shift in the distribution of income from wages to profits, as
many authors have stressed in the financialisation literature. This meant that the income of
the very rich increased and they started looking for places to invest it, and they ended up
mainly in Hedge funds. Large sums of capital looked went to financial markets looking for
an opportunity to get better returns than investing in productive sectors. These funds
searching for large and quick profits created a pressure for bank managers to disregard
risk considerations in order to make large profits from satisfying the huge demand for high
yield financial assets.
Income inequality created the conditions that allowed the financial crisis, working through
both the supply side and mostly by the demand side of financial assets (Lysandrou, 2013).
There was a demand for a large quantity of high return financial products. Banks
responded by creating MBSs and CDOs. MBSs are less opaque than CDOs, because the
latter have many layers while the former no. But since banks did not have enough assets to
construct MBSs, they turned to CDOs. Latter they turned to synthetic CDOs that are created
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quickly and without the need of a commercial banks supplying mortgages. CDOs proved an
ideal product for investors, because the market was apparently deep and secure. CDOs
were constructed with several assets, where subprime loans played a central role. Income
inequality also worked on the supply side of financial products, by offering the opportunity
to make loans to poor households. These households faced with lower wages and higher
living costs had difficulty in meeting their obligations towards banks, but even relatively
more wealthier households faced difficulties in periods of increasing interest rates and
asset prices fall (Langley, 2008).
On the other hand, there was a large amount of funds arriving to the US from Europe, China
and East Asia due to the US current account deficit. These funds pushed interest rate down
and increased the demand for financial products. Especially the European funds were
invested in risky assets. Joining these funds coming from abroad there was the funds from
non-financial firms, which devoted a growing share of their financial resources to invest in
financial markets.
The Subprime crisis gave its first signs in the summer of 2007 when the rate of default of
subprime loans started to increase considerably, due to the increase in interest rates by the
Fed and the reversal in the upward trend of US house prices in 2006. Kirkpatrick (2009) also
adds that default rates of the subprime segment intensified in that period due to the
resetting of some interest rates from their low initial levels, the so-called “teaser” interest
rates.
According to Rötheli (2010), the crumble in the US housing market was disastrous also for
banks because most of the credit contracts did not require further collateral (like future
income or other assets) beyond the house itself. Households could walk away from a house
with a negative equity without any further financial responsibilities.
Besides, Leão (2009) points out two other consequences of the increase of the default rate
of subprime loans. Firstly, banking institutions began selling the houses that were used as
collateral, intensifying the decline of house prices, with further negative repercussions in
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terms of private consumption and investment. Secondly, the value of securitised products
felt expressively, and they started to be called “toxic financial products”.
White (2009) stresses that the fall in prices of CDOs and MBOs illustrates that the initial
ratings for these structured products proved to be excessively optimistic. In this regard,
Nelson and Katzenstein (2011) confirm that after the collapse of the subprime crisis the
three main credit rating agencies downgraded large quantities of securitised products that
they had initially regarded as relatively safe assets. For instance, they show that actual
default rates for collateralised debt obligations of mortgage-back securities exceeded
bank’s projections by around 20,115 per cent on average.
The decline in the price of ABSs generated distrust between banks, because these “toxic
financial products” were spread across the global financial system, without their exact
location being known. Voinea and Anton (2009) recognise that doubts concerning ratings’
quality and price formation caused a strong exit of investors from the ABS market, massive
price falls and the total loss of liquidity of the market during the summer of 2007.
As a result of the fall in the ABS market, some important financial institutions faced
insolvency problems and they were rescued by governments (Bear Sterns, Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae in the US and Northern Rock in the UK are important examples).2 In September
2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers put in question the “too big to fail” assumption
and generated a climate of panic, leading to substantial instability in the international
financial markets, visible in the rise of volatility and in the sharp drop in prices of the main
cyclical assets such as shares and commodity prices.
After the third quarter of 2008, as the crisis became stringer, many banks failed in Europe
and in the US, which determined a generalised loss of confidence in financial institutions
(Kirkpatrick, 2009). Without trust between banks, interbank money markets dried up,
mainly in longer maturities, which led to a liquidity shortage with direct effects in the
reduction of banking credit and in the rise of interest rates for households and
2 Northern Rock failed due to liquidity problems.
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corporations. Even larger non-financial firms were unable to finance themselves in the
money market.
The constant need of investment banks to refinance the portfolios of subprime ABSs proved
tricky. The deterioration of the housing market and the consequent increase of the
perceived risk of securitised products made it more difficult to roll over short-term loans
against these assets (which were given as collateral). As such, banks were forced to sell
the ABSs that they could no longer finance, leading to a strong fall in the value of these
assets, which eroded banks’ capital and worsened funding difficulties. Banks were forced
to sell assets at low prices also to cover margin calls, reduce risk and contain losses.
At the same time, many investors hedged the ABSs through the use of Credit Default
Swaps3 (CDS). AIG was one of the main insurers of ABSs, guaranteeing billions of dollars.
Crotty (2009) explains that this hedging strategy made individual investors safer, but made
the financial system riskier. The absence of minimum capital requirements for insurance
companies issuing CDSs created an incentive for the creation of large amounts of these
products. During the crisis, faced with significant defaults, insurance companies did not
have enough capital to fulfil their obligations. In fact, when losses hit ABSs, AIG (and others
insurers) were not able to pay its commitments and rapidly entered in difficulty. The
absence of a central entity ensuring the payments of CDSs in case of failure of the insurer
created even more uncertainty in the markets.
CDSs played another important role in the crisis by facilitating the speculation that bond
prices would decrease. Besides allowing leveraged positions, those financial instruments
are more advantageous to investors that speculate in the decrease of prices than to
investors that speculate in the increase of prices (Soros, 2009). Their effect was to increase
even more the financing costs of distressed financial institutions.
3 Credit Default Swaps are derivatives products that allow a party to insure an eventual loss from a
loan default by paying a fee. They are financial swap agreements, according to which the seller (insurer) will
compensate the buyer in the case of default or other credit event. Until recently, it was not necessary to
actually own the security being ‘insured’.
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In general, derivatives take to an unprecedented extreme the separation between asset
ownership and direct ownership of a tangible or intangible asset (Wigan, 2009). In the case
of CDSs, investors can be exposed to CDOs without incurring the risk of the subprime
market. This reduces the incentive to monitor the quality of the underlying assets of CDOs.
CDSs also give the confidence that risk is controllable in a scientific manner, leading
investors to underestimate the true risk of their positions (Wigan, 2009).
As recognised by Jawadi (2010), international authorities reacted quickly, in order to limit
bankruptcies, reinforce confidence, contain the recessionary pressures and mitigate
liquidity problems. Against this background, most of international governments presented
various rescue packages for their banking systems, and central banks provided further
support measures, like aggressive cuts of interest rates and the implementation of liquidity
facilities.
In conclusion, we saw several factors responsible for the Subprime crisis. At the top is
usually found the wrong incentives of the several players in the CDOs market (Rötheli,
2010; Kashyap, 2010), including bank managers (Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011) and credit
rating agencies (Lang and Jangtiani, 2010; Gupta et al. 2010). 4 The production of CDOs,
which proved excessively complex and opaque, was facilitated by the bubble in the real
estate market (Voinea and Anton, 2009; Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011). Other commonly
pointed causes for the crisis include the excessive leverage of households and banks
(Hellwig, 2008), the US monetary policy (Foo, 2008; Rötheli, 2010), deregulation,
international imbalances related with a high US current account deficit, the large amount of
funds seeking higher return, which ultimately is linked with functional income distribution.
3. Risk Management failures
4 For simplicity we will refer to the three types of ABSs (Residential MBSs, Commercial MBSs, and
CDOs) only ABSs.
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Haubrich (2001), Jorion (2009) and Stulz (2009) note that even when risk management is
flawlessly executed, it does not guarantee that big losses do not occur. There can be an
unlucky one-in-a-hundred event or an overly risky business decision. Haubrich (2001) adds
that risk management may break down when optimal private levels of risk are not socially
optimal. The question that we would like to address is whether there was a failure of risk
management during the subprime crisis or if it was simply a case of bad luck or bad
business decisions.
We have organised the weaknesses of risk management identified in the subprime crisis
literature into three categories: methodology and technique, governance and strategy, and
regulation and external factors.
3.1 Methodology and technique
Stulz (2009) states that the risk management process involves five stages: identification,
measurement, communication, monitoring and management of risks. Problems have
arisen in each one of these stages. The first type of failure results from using inappropriate
risk metrics. If risk managers evaluate risk with measures that are ill-suited to the
corporation’s strategy, risk management will almost certainly fail.
During the subprime crisis, banks, credit rating agencies and international regulators
employed sophisticated risk management metrics, and VaR (Value-at-Risk) was the most
widely adopted model (Stulz, 2009; Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011). Since VaR models are
not meant to reveal the distribution of the losses that exceed the VaR limit, they are of little
use if risk managers want to understand potentially catastrophic losses with a low
probability of occurring (Stulz, 2009).
Crotty (2009) and Nelson and Katzenstein (2011) argue that VaR systematically
underestimates low-probability events because it is based on the Gaussian distribution,
which under-represents these high-cost events in distribution tails. Extreme and unlikely
events with serious consequences or “black swans” make the distribution more skewed
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(Taleb, 2007). Social events are impossible to model with the normal distribution due to
social contagion and feedback loops. The VaR model is adequate for normal times, but
performs poorly in crises.
Stulz (2009) notes that top risk management should not focus primarily on daily VaR but on
long-run indicators of risk. Moreover, daily VaR implicitly assumes that assets can be sold
quickly or hedged and, therefore, a corporation can essentially limit its losses within a day.
But this may not occur at a time of low liquidity like the subprime crisis.
Nelson and Katzenstein (2011) advocate that the failures of the VaR methodology were
determinant in creating and exacerbating the subprime collapse. Firstly, VaR was
calculated on the basis of very short time series data (often less than 12 months), which did
not include any serious crises. According to Lang and Jagtiani (2010), corporations chose
more sophisticated and complex models with larger data elements and covering a shorter
period in detriment of models covering longer periods but with fewer data elements.
Therefore, there was an under-valuation of risk. Moreover, it was believed that old ABS
data were not relevant given the changes in the mortgage market in the previous two
decades.
The risk of structured subprime products (CDO and MBS) was assessed assuming that
house prices would grow forever, clearly underestimating risk (SSG, 2008). Based on the
available historical data, it was difficult for risk managers to estimate the losses arising
from a wide housing market as this had only occurred in the 1930s (Crotty, 2009; Nelson
and Katzenstein, 2011). This is a good illustration of the fact that statistical techniques of
risk management are useful tools when there is a lot of data and when it is reasonable to
expect future returns to have the same distribution of past returns (Stulz, 2009).
In addition, VaR models did not capture well the behaviour of new structured debt products
when severe shocks hit markets and liquidity decreases (SSG, 2008). A major difficulty with
these products is that there are no historical data to assess their risk and firms have to use
proxies (e.g. corporate bonds rated Aaa), which proved wrong. Some firms assumed
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incorrectly that the historical return volatility of corporate bonds rated Aaa could proxy the
returns’ volatility of senior tranches of CDOs.
Nelson and Katzenstein (2011) also claim that the wide adoption of VaR models amplified
the crisis by inducing “similar and simultaneous behaviour by numerous players”. Risk
measured by VaR models rises at times of increased volatility and, in an attempt to reduce
risk, investors start selling, thus amplifying the crisis (The Economist, 2008).
In fact, VaR has difficulty in capturing systemic risk since it assumes that each firm’s
actions do not affect the market outcome (Stiglitz 2009; Turner, 2009). However, in a
situation where all firms behave in a similar way, the risk will be much higher than the
model predicts. It is equally disturbing that the VaR assessment of risk may be lowest
precisely when systemic risk is at its highest level, as in the spring of 2007.
Hellwig (2008), Crotty (2009) and Jackson (2010) also criticise the VaR hypothesis that
future asset price correlations will be similar to those of the past. Crotty (2009) adds that
securities that were kept off the balance sheet were not included in VaR estimations,
ignoring the possibility that the risk from these securities may come back onto the balance
sheet (Jackson, 2010).
Lang and Jagtiani (2010) and Beyhaghi and Hawley (2011) agree that the use of
sophisticated but untested models of risk management was a key element of the crisis and
led to many corporations underestimating risks and engaging in excessive risk taking. The
Subprime crisis was the first real “laboratory” to assess the accuracy and efficacy of many
quantitative models.
Ashby (2010) demonstrates that many financial institutions failed to adopt adequate stress
and scenario testing and some showed an excessive reliance on quantitative tools. Banks
that made stress tests used very weak assumptions; they never considered a full freezing
of the money market (Larosière et al, 2009) and overestimated the advantages of
diversification in a crisis (SSG, 2008).
Several reasons are advanced for the overconfidence in quantitative risk models and
under-utilisation of qualitative approaches. Firstly, a culture had emerged that focused on
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the market and quantification. Another factor was the need to use rules of thumb in the
presence of uncertainty (Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011). Finally, Lapavitsas (2011) shows
that as banks increased credit to households and information technology improved, they
started to use sophisticated statistical techniques of credit scoring to assess households'
risks due to the large number of households and the relative small size of each transaction.
As a result risk assessment started to be based less on ‘relational’ methods, even in the
case of credit to corporations. In addition, due diligence on marketed loans was usually
subcontracted to external institutions as credit rating agencies. The result of this was a
smaller ability of banks to evaluate risk qualitatively.
A side effect of quantitative risk models is that they give the impression that organisations
are protected against risk, ultimately leading to professionals being overconfident, with an
elimination of critical reasoning (Hellwig, 2008; Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011).
Nevertheless, they had already failed in other situations like the East Asian crisis of 1997-
98 and in the Russian sovereign debt default in 1998. On the other hand, Nelson and
Katzenstein (2011) argue that uncertainty is irreducible and unquantifiable, and the
mathematical treatment of risk does not make sense, as past events cannot robustly make
predictions of future events. By definition, things that are unpredictable cannot be
anticipated (Turner, 2009).
The subprime crisis required a more qualitative approach to risk (Voinea and Anton, 2009;
Nelson and Katzenstein, 2011). Sophisticated statistical models could not substitute
qualitative judgments on the nature of the housing market boom, the presence of irrational
exuberance and the problems around moral hazard and adverse selection in the subprime
credit market and securitisation process (Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). This analysis should
have taken into account that the economy becomes unstable at times of economic growth
due to the excess of optimism (Lakonishok et al, 1995) and the emergence of speculators
(Minsky, 1994). Traditional tools in credit risk management like industry analysis were also
absent from the CDO market study (SSG, 2008). A traditional tool in credit risk management
like industry analysis was also absent from the CDOs market’s study (SSG, 2008).
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Another important failure in the subprime crisis was that some risks were overlooked.
Jorion (2009) notes that the crisis exposed serious flaws in risk models, namely in the risk
categories “known unknowns” i.e. risks identified but measured inaccurately (model risk
and liquidity risk) as well as “unknown unknowns”, namely forgotten risks (structural and
regulatory changes in capital markets and contagion). Regarding the category of model
risk, he notes that the failure of risk management derived from ignoring some important
known risk factors, i.e. basis risk between cash bonds and CDS (see also SSG, 2008), and
due to errors in the mapping process which consists of replacing positions with exposures
on the risk factors.
In relation to liquidity risk, Jorion (2009) argues that management does not usually account
for this due to its complexity and the difficulty of reducing it to simple quantitative rules. He
adds that liquidity risk encompasses both asset liquidity risk (the price impact of large
asset sales) and funding liquidity risk (when a corporation cannot meet cash flow or
collateral needs). Consequently, financial corporations generally did not anticipate the
liquidity constraints during the subprime crisis (Voinea and Anton, 2009), or the fact that
credit risk problems could turn into liquidity problems (Larosière et al., 2009).
Reputational risk was also underestimated. During the financial turmoil, banks felt obliged
to supply liquidity to conduits and SIVs in order to maintain their reputation (SSG, 2008).
Conduits and SIVs proved to be a source of systemic risk that was largely ignored due to
their lack of transparency (Hellwig, 2008). Banks owning such vehicles did not incorporate
them into quantitative models, also because they did not have the required information.
Similarly, Jorion (2009) claims that it is difficult to account fully for counterparty risk, and
consequently most scenarios failed to consider it. He stresses that we need to know not
only our counterparties, but also our counterparty’s counterparties. This risk became
increasingly important due to the use of derivatives to invest and hedge positions. The
counterparty risk and the regulatory risk were “unknown unknowns” outside most
scenarios. An example of regulatory risk was the sudden prohibition of short sale
operations that damaged hedging strategies during the 2008 crisis. Structural changes in
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the market like the transformation of investment banks into commercial banks, with the
corresponding decline in leverage, are also important factors of risk.
Lang and Jagtiani (2010) and Sabato (2009) also argue that any explanation for the
mortgage crisis is incomplete if it does not consider why corporations took extremely
concentrated positions in the mortgage market despite the basic principle of diversification.
More fundamentally, according to Beyhaghi and Hawley (2011) and Williams (2011), risk
management failed due to its unrealistic theoretical assumptions. They criticise key
assumptions of the modern portfolio theory and risk management as for instance the
efficient market hypothesis, the rationality of investors; the neglect of herding and seasonal
habits of investors; the absence of asset bubbles, symmetric information; the use of
popular market indices as a proxy for market portfolios; the existence of unlimited liquidity
and unlimited capital; among others.
Williams (2011) agrees with Beyhaghi and Hawley (2011)’s view and describes how the field
of finance has gone from a study of practical matters in the 1950s to a discipline based on
constructs at odds with reality. Finance research is based on unrealistic assumptions,
sometimes assume equilibrium instead of proving it, ignore evidence, assume rationality of
market participants, and fit statistical models to uncertainty. The consequence has been
the construction of a field of knowledge that deceives practitioners and has contributed to
the emergence of financial crises.
They even argue that the generalised use of these theoretical assumptions led to feedback
loops and deceived practitioners, which paradoxically made risk management contribute to
the increase of risk. González-Páramo (2011) stresses that banks were overconfident about
the efficiency of markets and the ability of financial innovations to spread risk. Crotty (2009)
notes that, in some cases, risks were transferred to clients who were not able to
understand them fully, thereby increasing systemic risk in international financial markets.
The violation of the financial theory’s assumptions could originate unintended
consequences given its widespread adoption. They even argue that the generalised use of
those theoretical assumptions has led to feedback loops and deceived practitioners, which
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paradoxically made risk management to contribute to the increase of risk. González-
Páramo (2011) stresses that banks had overconfidence in the efficiency of markets, and in
the ability of financial innovations to spread risk. Crotty (2009) notes that, in some cases,
risks have been transferred to clients who were not able to understand them fully, thereby
increasing systemic risk in international financial markets.
Risk management has become a key activity for all financial corporations, functioning as a
prerequisite for their own profitability and survival. The wide acceptance of this view has led
to the emergence of new regulation and recommendations on corporate governance in
order to prevent bankruptcies, losses, and scandals. Some examples are the “Cadbury
Report” by the London Stock Exchange in 1992, the “Principles of Corporate Governance”
by the OECD in 1998, the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” in the USA in 2002, the introduction of
KonTrag in Germany in 1998, and above all the Basel Agreements.
An interesting aspect is that the evolution of financial products outpaced the evolution of
risk management (Voinea and Anton, 2009) and the regulators' capacity to adapt (González-
Páramo, 2011). Structured financial products were extremely complex, with several layers
of MBS making risk evaluation difficult (Larosière et al, 2009). Firms did not anticipate that
losses could affect even the super-senior tranches of CDO (SSG, 2008).
This complexity contributed to the lack of transparency of the MBS and CDO markets
(Crotty, 2009) that was amplified by the securitisation process (Stiglitz, 2009). Moreover, the
unclear situation of certain financial institutions raised doubts about the dimension and
location of credit risk and undermined confidence in the system (Larosière et al, 2009).
3.2 Governance and the strategic level
26
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
The subprime crisis is also explained by failures in corporate governance that did not
safeguard excessive risk taking. Some authors emphasise that the lack of implementation
of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) made it difficult to prevent risks (Kirkpatrick, 2009).
In the ERM approach, all risks are assembled in a strategic and coordinated framework and
a specific entity has an overview of the risk. Three main weaknesses in the insufficient
implementation of such a strategy have been reported. Firstly, the disaggregated vision of
risk was a key problem (Sabato, 2010; Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). By trying to create an
independent risk management function, organisations isolated it from the overall
investment process and thus limited its ability to influence the main decisions (Flaherty et
al., 2013). Moreover, financial innovation associated with the subprime market was
developed by isolated departments and they were not integrated in the general business
model, which implied that firms had no perception of their aggregate risk (The Economist,
2008). The disaggregated vision of risk also resulted from an inadequate and fragmented
infrastructure that made effective risk identification and measurement difficult (SSG, 2009).
In some cases, this problem was clearly associated with the poor integration of data that
had resulted from corporations’ multiple mergers and acquisitions.
Secondly, Kirkpatrick (2009), SSG (2009) and Sabato (2010) say that the failure of risk
management in most international banks was in part due to the lack of a defined capital
allocation strategy by the board, with the delineation and imposition of a level of acceptable
risk and suitable risk metrics, where risk tolerance (minimum expected return and the
maximum acceptable risk) and risk appetite (desired expected return and desired
acceptable risk) are clearly defined and are used to assess group’s divisions. There was
also a failure in the definition of suitable risk metrics by the board (Kirkpatrick, 2009).
Thirdly and finally, the figure of Chief Risk Officer (CRO) was not sufficiently important at
board level (Lang and Jagtiani, 2010), and risk management was considered a support
function (KPMG, 2009).
Failures in reporting risk and communication between risk management staff and senior
management were also common in financial institutions and information was not provided
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with sufficient regularity (Ashby, 2010; Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). Nevertheless, KPMG
(2009)’s survey reports that communication across units of the organisation did not play a
major role in the crisis.
This meant that the board and senior management did not know the overall exposure of
companies to risk, which was also aggravated by the fact that they did not fully understand
the new structured products (Larosière et al, 2009; Turner, 2009). The board also failed to
have proper control over business line managers due to inadequate internal risk control
and auditing (Larosière et al, 2009; SSG, 2009; Lang and Jagtiani, 2010), namely there were
delays in the identification, limitation and treatment of losses and frauds (Jawadi, 2010).
The reasons for excessive risk taking by traders can be found in the inadequate supervision
by regulators, in arrangements that favoured risk takers at the expense of control
personnel (SSG, 2009), and complicity between managers and traders that can represent
fraud (Jawadi, 2010). The complicity between managers and traders to take excessive risk
has to be understood in the context of an irrationally exuberant market. In a situation where
prices were growing exponentially, investors may have found profitable to stay in the
market and take the risk, and get out of the market before the bubble burst. For some
banks that did not happen, also because the decline in prices has affected unexpectedly the
super-senior tranches of CDOs and dried up liquidity suddenly.
It should also be noted that compensation arrangements were not associated with the
strategy, risk appetite and long-term interests of corporations (Kirkpatrick, 2009; KPMG,
2009). They were skewed to maximise same year results, disconnected from risk, as they
did not take into account the true economic profits with the deduction of all appropriate
costs (SSG, 2009). Remuneration schemes favoured high risk/high return investments
(Acharya and Richardson, 2009; Crotty, 2009; Kashyap, 2010). Lang and Jagtiani (2010)
focus on the fact that managers were given incentives to increase the profitability of their
business lines rather than consider the corporation’s overall risk position. Structured
products were adequate for business line managers to produce large gains with individual
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positions that looked to have low risk. This is the basic principal-agent problem that risk
management control is meant to address.
According to the SSG (2009), another main problem associated with compensation practices
was that they were driven by the need to attract and retain talent and often did not
integrated with the corporation’s risk control.
Hellwig (2008) adds that employees were concerned with their careers and peer pressure
as well as remuneration. Anyone that doubted a new and profitable business like the MBO
would not be well regarded by colleagues.
Freeman (2010) defends that the huge monetary rewards given to high-level managers in
financial institutions, instead of leading them to improve products offered, made them
redistribute rents from consumers to firms, make high-risk investments and misreport
financial returns. The link between short run stock price evolution and managers’
remunerations was one way through which financialisation aligned corporations with
financial markets interests, as we saw in the introduction. This was a fundamental factor,
among others, driving the tendency for short-termism is business decisions (Orhangazi,
2008:74).
The top management of commercial banks was interested in increasing assets and profits,
which meant they had to increase credit. Since good borrowers already had credit, the only
alternative was to increase credit to less creditworthy clients: the subprime segment
(Adrian and Shin, 2010).
Finally, Ashby (2010)’s survey stresses human and cultural weaknesses such as ego, greed,
and “disaster myopia”. It can be concluded from KPMG (2009)’s survey that risk culture was
one of the elements of risk management that most contributed to the crisis.
3.3 Regulation and external factors
External conditions also made risk management more difficult and created incentives for
excessive risk taking. The assignment of incorrect ratings by rating agencies led banks
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towards excessive risk. More generally, the incentives of all agents in the securitisation
chain were misaligned. Banks also did not perform appropriate due diligences and relied
excessively on external ratings (González-Páramo, 2011).
Hellwig (2008) and Ashby (2010) found that competitive pressures prevented financial
institutions from staying out of the most profitable risky activities.
Sabato (2009) points out that the poor regulatory framework based on the belief that banks
could be trusted to regulate themselves was one of the main sources of the subprime
crisis. The lack of regulation can also be explained by the capture of regulators by the
financial sector. The financial sector donates money to political parties, does strong lobby,
and regulators end up working or lobbying for the sector they regulated. Probably, this was
the reason why Governments and regulators did not strength regulation and did not act in
face of information indicating that something was wrong on the mortgage market. Freeman
(2010) claims that Governments experimented laissez-faire capitalism by deregulating
financial markets.
Indeed, Basel II trusted in banks’ own models to assess some important risks like market
and credit risks. Ashby (2010)’s interviewees (risk managers from a range of financial
institutions) indicated the presence of significant regulatory failures in design (for instance,
Basel II and its focus on capital requirements) and implementation (namely, supervisors'
capacity to make effective judgements). One of the main criticisms of Basel II was the
incentive to use credit securitisation and shadow banking organisations to reduce
regulatory capital. The regulatory framework was lax and almost non-existent in the
shadow banking system (Crotty, 2009). Since they were trusting in capital regulation,
regulators around the world had not efficiently monitored risk management functions and
did not prevent highly concentrated risk.
Hellwig (2008) highlights other perverse effect of capital regulation. Banks were able to use
quantitative risk management models to economise regulatory, thus exacerbating the
insufficiency of capital that amplified the crisis.
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Dowd (2009) and Lang and Jagtiani (2010) emphasise that large financial corporations were
not given appropriate incentives to worry about “tail-risk” due to the government's “too big
to fail” policy. The largest banks were financed at lower rates than their true risk justified
and this allowed them to expand risky activities even further (Moss, 2009). Panageas (2009)
develops a model where the possibility of bail out by outside stakeholders allows firms to
choose high volatility investments while net worth is high.
Monetary policy also played a role by mitigating the fall in asset prices, especially after the
burst of the internet bubble, which prevented the market re-assessing the importance of
risk (Gonzáles-Páramo, 2011).
Kirkpatrick (2009) stresses that there were gaps in accounting standards and regulatory
requirements, e.g. the absence of commonly accepted accounting principles for risky
products that would ensure a clear and comparable disclosure in annual reports. Banks
have used different valuation methods for the same financial asset, which contributed to
the scarce transparency in the financial industry. Better accounting standards, greater
transparency about risks and products would have facilitated the working of market
discipline, which did not play a major role in limiting risk taking by banks (Turner, 2009).
Moreover, Kirkpatrick (2009) recognises that the division of responsibilities between the
different supervisors was not very clear.
Best (2010) is sceptical that other financial crises will be avoided by providing the market
with better and more information about financial instruments because the true risk of some
instruments is impossible to calculate and it is unclear whether the market has the ability
or interest in making appropriate use of that information.
4. Risk Management Recommendations
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Many lessons can be learnt and recommendations made by identifying the faults in risk
management. Once again we group these into three broad areas: methodology and
technique; governance and strategy; and regulation and external factors.
4.1 Methodology and technique
One main lesson from the crisis is that some types of risks cannot be overlooked and
others must be taken particularly seriously. Even though liquidity, counterparty and
regulatory risks are difficult to measure, banks should be aware of them; they should have
capital buffers to prevent them, and they should not be so big that they lead to bankruptcy
(Jorion, 2009). 5 Since liquidity is a risk factor that can generate very high volatility of
returns, risk managers should monitor it on all their securities, even on those that appear
very liquid (Golub and Crum, 2010). Nevertheless, since banks cannot have enough capital
to service a systemic collapse of the financial system, the role of risk manager of last
resort rests on the regulator (Jorion, 2009).
Concentration risk also warrants a watchful eye, mainly where there are new financial
products like the subprime securities that were largely untested (CRMPG, 2008; Foo, 2008;
Jackson, 2010).
Golub and Crum (2010) also stress that corporations should adapt to the increasing
importance of policy or regulatory risk, because changes in policy often result in a
structural break in the covariance of economic variables. In many markets policy risk
surpasses the risk arising from economic fundamentals.
Golub and Crum (2010) argue that corporations should acknowledge that market risk can
change dramatically and they should be very vigilant about investments that require
continuity in risk appetite or the ability to foresee risk appetite and volatilities. Foo (2008)
claims that investors should take into account that excessive demand for financial products
may lead prices to move away from fundamentals. Another important message of the crisis
5
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is that risk cannot be seen in a static environment (The Economist, 2008). In the presence of
a systemic event, things hitherto taken for granted disappear when all investors start
selling and panic sets in.
A comprehensive view of all risks must be adopted to capture the interaction between
different types of risks leading to compounding effects (González-Páramo, 2011). For
example, liquidity risk during the crisis interacted with market risk and both reinforced
each other.
The use of a less quantitative approach to risk is also commonly recommended. Risk
management is a task for experienced professionals and not machines (Jorion, 2009) and
risk models should support and not drive decision making (KPMG, 2009). Effective risk
management needs mainly good reasonable decisions, naturally based on quantitative data
that is clear for top managers and other stakeholders to understand.
Other tools of risk analysis are suggested that complement quantitative models. Stulz
(2009) concludes that the probabilities of large losses cannot be measured very precisely
and corporations should therefore rely less on these estimates and pay more attention to
the implications of such losses on their profitability and survival. Instead of depending on
traditional measures of risk, based on stable returns and correlations, they should
construct forward-looking scenarios that make more use of expert views (SSG, 2008;
Jorion, 2009) and stress tests (Ashby, 2010; Jackson, 2010), especially to assess situations
of contagion (CRMPG, 2008) and policy risk (Golub and Crum, 2010). Institutions are
required to consider the new types of risk; notably, risk plans should lead and not lag
behind business development (Accenture, 2013). A more critical and deeper approach that
goes beyond the available technology is also necessary when analysing risk (CRMPG, 2008).
The very nature of extreme events or “black swans” mean they cannot be predicted, but
their impact can be minimised if, for example, potential areas in which extreme events may
occur or where failure is highly costly are identified (Taleb, 2007). Instead of looking
comfort in historic regularities, risk managers should be alert for new risks different from
the past. The most important lesson of the subprime crisis is that financial crises are more
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common than previously thought, and they may be different from past crises (Gónzalez-
Páramo, 2011).
Improvements should be made to some technical aspects of quantitative analysis used by
banks and regulators that failed during the crisis (Stiglitz, 2009). For example: risk models
should be flexible enough to adapt to changes in market conditions, use other than normal
distributions, be aware that correlations may change in crises, use longer samples that
include serious crises (or use qualitative analysis when this is not possible), include off-
balance-sheet securities in the models’ estimates of risk, and not over-rely on untested
models. In short, we can conclude that although quantitative models are an important tool
for banks and regulators to assess risk, their application needs to be improved and they
should be complemented with qualitative tools, analyses and expert views. Gónzalez-
Páramo (2011) indicates that the problem is not the risk measures and models used per se,
but the lack of understanding of their limitations. Unlike natural sciences which have
fundamental laws, economics and finance study a system composed of human interactions.
Golub and Crum (2010) stress that investors in securitised products should look beyond
data in order to develop a deeper and direct understanding of the underlying assets; this
includes the behaviour, incentives and practices of all players involved in the securitisation
process (borrowers, originators, credit rating agencies, and investment banks). In the
Subprime crisis the risk of ABS started in the bottom of the chain, with incentives and
practices of lenders (example: adjustable lending rates) creating a level of risk that was not
anticipated by investors.
Banks that did well in the 2008 crisis avoided many of the above mentioned mistakes (SSG,
2008). Resilient banks had a firm-wide risk perspective, a cooperative organisational
structure of risk management, shared information across departments, and developed in-
house expertise. This leads us to the importance of Governance issues.
4.2 Governance and strategy
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The technical and methodological issues in risk management are undoubtedly important,
but even the best techniques will be misused in the absence of the right governance and
incentives. KPMG (2009) and Ashby (2010) suggests the need to improve risk governance
and create a risk culture through the widespread adoption of the ERM approach to ensure
that all employees understand and are involved proactively in the risk management
process. The board needs to set realistic limits on risks that fit the institution's culture and
risk aversion and that are the foundation of the system of controls within the organisation
(see also SSG, 2008). Ashby (2010) recommends the creation of a culture of prudence and
security.
Risk governance also implies the need to increase the importance organisations give to
risk-related matters. Managers should become more risk aware, give careful consideration
to the risks associated with their strategic decisions, manage risk for longer horizons, take
a comprehensive view of all risks, and be prepared to react rapidly and determinedly when
they believe firms are exposed to excessive risk (Stulz, 2009; Ashby, 2010). Thus, risk
managers should build contingency hedging plans that can be implemented quickly if the
corporation wants to reduce its risk in a short period.
It is necessary to build stronger relations between all levels of the organisation, including
the business lines, audit committee, internal audit and board of directors (KPMG, 2009).
Reliable quantitative and qualitative information should move between them in a timely
manner.
Walker (2009) and Jackson (2010) defend the introduction of a board of risk separate from
the board of directors and independent from the audit committee; its role would be to
oversee and guide the directors on current and future risk exposures. The Walker Report
also recommends having a CRO that participate in risk management and control with a
firm-wide perspective and independence from business units. In this regard, Aebi et al.
(2012) conclude that banks with the best performance during the subprime crisis were
those where the CRO reported directly to the board of directors and not to the CEO. These
authors conclude that banks should prepare for a future financial crisis by improving the
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quality of risk management practices, namely having CEO and CRO at the same level and
responding to the board of directors. This improvement could lead to better performance
during crises, but to a lower performance in a non-crisis environment.
According to the Accenture (2013) survey of 446 financial and non-financial organisations
around the world, some progress has already been made as they nearly all have a CRO
(though some may not have a formal title); it also reports that nowadays risk management
plays a much bigger role in business decisions.
Even though several authors propose that financial firms should adopt an ERM of risk, this
approach is not free of criticism. Power (2009) suggests that ERM uses a control-based
approach and cannot appreciate the risk of the organisation's interconnectedness with the
economy. Power (2009) argues in favour of Business Continuity Management (BCM), which
is a hybrid approach to risk management, developed in recent years, and includes IT and
emergency management professionals among others. It uses non-accounting knowledge to
shed light on the interconnected characteristic of economic life.
Risk can only become more relevant in an organisation if the effectiveness of risk control
frameworks is improved, namely through more accurate and timely risk reports (Ashby,
2010) and greater independence between traders and risk controllers (Jawadi, 2010). Risk
limits are especially important in new lines of business, where the measurement of risk is
more imprecise (The Economist, 2008). In support of this recommendation, Ellul and
Yerramilli (2010) show that more effective risk controls reduced the risk of US bank holding
companies during the subprime crisis.
The improvement in risk management is also fundamentally related to a stronger long-
term investment in high-quality professionals and technology (Golub and Crum, 2010;
Accenture, 2013). Each corporation should ensure it has a team of professional risk
managers with substantial subject matter expertise, practical experience and strong
communication skills, as well as the appropriate technology and infrastructures to develop
suitable risk metrics. KPMG (2009) adds that banks need to improve risk expertise at senior
levels, because it is crucial for more robust and informed business decisions.
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Regarding in-house knowledge on credit risk, Golub and Crum (2010) add that corporations
should recognise that financial certification is useless during systemic shocks. Instead,
they must rely more upon their own credit analysis, surveillance and due diligence
capabilities to understand investments, or avoid investing in certain classes of risky assets
(Gónzalez-Páramo, 2011).
Given that good professionals can make bad risk decisions when faced with the wrong
incentives, changes in the remuneration system are often recommended. Crotty and
Epstein (2009) indicate that the elimination of the widespread bad incentive structures and
moral hazard in the financial system is key to avoiding a future crisis. In particular, the top
management of bailed out institutions should also be strongly penalised. Incentives should
be based on long-term shareholder interests (Crotty and Epstein, 2009; KPMG, 2009;
Walker, 2009; Ashby, 2010; Jackson, 2010), without asymmetries in the treatment of gains
and losses (Stiglitz, 2009). Walker (2009) and Rötheli (2010) suggest that compensations
should take into account the risk assumed, with salaries and bonuses linked to risk
measures and not only to profitability. KPMG (2009)’s survey indicates that the main priority
of risk managers in terms of remunerations is to make more use of risk-adjusted
measures and a greater use of long-term indicators to remunerate performance.
4.3 Regulation and external factors
A change in regulation is also essential to promote a safer financial system. Gualandri et al.
(2009) note that it is necessary to rethink the Basel Accord in order to take the relation
between solvency and liquidity into account. They agree that good liquidity risk
management helps lower the probability of insolvency and that a bank's capacity to obtain
liquidity in severe market conditions depends directly on the adequacy of its capital. These
authors, SSG (2008) and González-Páramo (2011) propose the development of more robust,
standardised and rigorous stress testing and contingency funding plans to minimise the
losses when financial strains occur.
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The maximum leverage ratios of investment banks should also be reduced to make them
less vulnerable to changes in market risk. More generally, in booms regulators should be
aware of the risk of rising leverage in the financial system (Stiglitz, 2009). The creation of
counter-cyclical capital requirements to restrict the growth of financial assets in good
times has been proposed by Crotty and Epstein (2009). These proposals have already been
addressed in Basel III. In Canada, a strong regulatory control of capital implied that
Canadian banks were better capitalised than US counterparts before and during the
subprime crisis, thus contributing to a better performance of banks in Canada during this
crisis (Seccareccia, 2013).
Gualandri et al. (2009) also recommend greater harmonisation and coordination of national
liquidity regimes and supervision practices, especially for the large banks and financial
conglomerates. The global financial infrastructure and policy response should be changed
to better address counterparty risk, avoid contagion effects (González-Páramo, 2011) and
maintain public trust in banks by reacting strongly to crises (Foo, 2008). The rescue of
problematic banks by authorities is defendable to avoid public panic and social turmoil.
Changing the treatment of large banks is another topic on the reform agenda not only
because bailouts normally prove too expensive for the tax payer (Rötheli, 2010) but also due
to the moral hazard caused by the existence of “too big to fail” banks (González-Páramo,
2011). Rötheli (2010) proposes introducing limits on the size of individual banks or the
practice of special supervision for large banks. In our view, the latter option is probably the
most realistic and with fewer social costs given the role large banks play in innovation and
price reductions. But Stiglitz (2009) supports the break-up of large banks due to both the
“too big to fail” issue and competition problems. Such proposals have to take into
consideration that more competition may imply banks have greater incentives to undertake
risky activities. Canada’s case study shows that low competition between banks may
promote more financial stability (Seccareccia, 2013). In Canada, an environment of low
competition between banks, with considerable profits from traditional banking activities,
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did not create the incentive to go to the business of risky new financial products and to
increase excessively leverage.
Any future bailouts of banks should be funded by financial institutions (Crotty and Epstein,
2009). A scheme similar to the insurance deposit scheme for commercial banks should be
created for the other financial institutions.
Stiglitz (2009) and Rötheli (2010) adds that central banks should be more concerned with
financial market stability (including asset bubbles) and its impact on growth and
employment, and make use of other tools to guarantee it (e.g. the practice of credit targets
on credit crunches or the monitoring of credit aggregates during expansions). The
formation of a Financial Markets Stability Authority to monitor the stability of the entire
financial system is crucial (Stiglitz, 2009). It is crucial the creation of a Financial Markets
Stability Authority, which main concern would be the stability of the entire financial system
(Stiglitz, 2009).
The shadow banking system and investment banks must also be adequately regulated, and
off-balance-sheet vehicles should be subject to adequate capital requirements that
eliminate regulatory arbitrage (Crotty and Epstein, 2009). Similarly, increases in the capital
required for some securitised assets should be placed on the agenda and reputational risk
(associated with conduits and SIVs) should be addressed (SSG, 2008).
In addition, Rötheli (2010) defends more transparency and greater regulation of off-
balance-sheet products (like loan guarantees, loan commitments and derivatives).
Although the initial goal of these products was to manage risk, their use can increase risk
in the presence of insufficient internal control. The accounting and disclosure of off-
balance-sheet vehicles and products should be clearer; during the recent financial crisis,
knowing which banks had the so called “toxic products” was a major problem (SSG, 2008;
Kirkpatrick, 2009). Shareholders and risk managers must also collaborate to improve the
functioning of financial markets by producing better information (Rötheli, 2010).
However, Stiglitz (2009) and Ashby (2010) stresses that capital rules naturally lead to
regulatory arbitrage in banks, and therefore these rules cannot replace close supervision
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of bank practices. Ashby (2010) recalls that capital regulation may have negative effects on
the quality of risk management and financial innovation, and that regulators should find a
balance between hard rules and flexible good practices.
Rötheli (2010) also recommends a reform of credit rating agencies in order to eliminate the
tendency towards the underestimation of risks due to conflicts of interests. Measuring the
accuracy of ratings would be a good solution. Stiglitz (2009) argues that rating agencies
should be carefully regulated and that the government should create a rating agency.
Crotty and Epstein (2009) defend that any financial product that is too complex to be sold in
an exchange should be prohibited. Confining financial products to exchanges would
increase transparency and efficiency of the economy, reduce counterparty risk, and limit
the size of the market of these products (Stiglitz, 2009). Regulatory agencies should also
monitor the creation of new financial products closely and apply a “regulatory
precautionary principle” to assess whether a new product should be allowed in the market
in light of its systemic impact (Crotty and Epstein, 2009).
Jackson (2010) advocates that the lack of standardised structures or documentation in
mortgage securitisation made search costs very high, which increased the reliance on
ratings. At the same time, the standards of due diligence declined over time. According to
Crotty and Epstein (2009), banks that create complex structured products should be
required to undertake due diligence to evaluate the risk of each underlying mortgage; the
ultimate ownership of the mortgage should be clear and it should be impossible for this to
be done externally by rating agencies. This would clarify the risk of complex products and
make their production less profitable. Moreover, the bank originating the mortgage should
retain at least a 20% equity share (Stiglitz, 2009).
Price setting in the MBS market should also be made clearer (Voinea and Anton, 2009).
Accordingly, the ECB and market participants already promoted an initiative to disclose
information on each loan on the European ABS market (Gónzalez-Páramo, 2011). At the
bottom of the chain, predatory credit and usury practices should also be banned by
regulation and supervision. Variable rates in mortgages, where the interest rate can
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increase substantially after an initial period of low interest, should also be prohibited
especially for low-income individuals (Stiglitz, 2009).
5. Concluding remarks
This paper discusses the role of risk management in the context of the subprime financial
crisis. There is no doubt that several macroeconomic factors have to be taken into account
in order to understand the crisis; these include the increase in house prices, the high
demand of financial products from international investors, the Fed's low interest rate
policy, and regulation errors. However, the behaviour of financial corporations was at the
core of the crisis; not only were they too optimistic and took excessive risk without making
a correct appraisal of risk across the subprime securitisation chain, but they also created
complex financial products with little transparency and used CDS that made the financial
system riskier.
The reasons for financial institutions' failure to manage risk appropriately are intriguing,
because this is one of their main roles in the economy. We organised the explanations for
this failure into three main groups: technique and methodology, corporate governance and
strategy, and regulation and external factors. At the technical level, risk models showed
several limitations; when dealing with new and complex products in particular, qualitative
judgments were largely ignored and several important risks were overlooked (namely
liquidity, counterparty, and systemic risks). Another major shortcoming was the
inappropriate risk governance structure that gave little importance to risk matters and was
characterised by a fragmented vision of risk, poor monitoring and auditing, wrongly
designed incentives, and cultural weaknesses. Regulators and external forces also failed to
fulfil their role correctly due to a lack of efficient monitoring by regulators, the incorrect
design of Basel II on some key aspects, the “too big to fail” protection, poor accounting
standards, and insufficient market discipline.
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Given the shortcomings identified, the literature proposes recommendations to improve
risk management. From the methodological and technical perspective, it is important to
pay more attention to certain risks. Qualitative models, scenarios analysis and stress tests
should complement quantitative analysis; and quantitative analysis needs to be improved.
Regarding governance, institutions should have a strategic approach to risk, be concerned
with their long-term survival and align their remunerations schemes accordingly; the risk
governance structure should be strengthened. Finally, regulation must be changed to avoid
a future crisis. The Basel Agreement and prudential regulation must be reassessed,
reforms made to credit rating agencies; the transparency and regulation of off-balance-
sheet products and vehicles must be increased, the “too big to fail” effect addressed and
improvements must also be made to the structure of markets, and monetary policy
awareness of asset price bubbles must be raised.
Even though much still needs to be done, many of the aforementioned recommendations
have already been undertaken by regulators around the world. Basel III is probably the
most relevant step towards stronger regulation, with a reinforcement of capital
requirements, and the introduction of new liquidity requirements. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision also issued new regulations in 2013 on risk data aggregation and risk
reporting that were applicable to systemically important banks at the global and domestic
levels. Measures have also been taken to increase the trade of derivatives in organised and
transparent markets. Furthermore, the EU started debating a proposal to limit bankers’
bonus in 2012 (Leão and Leão, 2012). Other important measures are the introduction of a
resolution framework for international financial firms, and procedures to deal with banks of
systemic importance (Giustiniani and Thornton, 2011).
Our discussion supports the financialisation perspective of risk management in the crisis.
Large non-financial firms, previously a major source of profit for banks, have started to
raise funds directly on the markets (Lapavitsas, 2011). As a result, and in a context of
deregulation of the financial system, the banking system has gone through a deep
restructuring process with the emergence of the shadow banking system, the move from
42
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800
traditional banking to fee-generating banking grounded on the originate-and-distribute
model, and the increase of lending to households rather than to firms (Stockhammer,
2010).
One of the conduits of financialisation is the alignment between corporate interests and
financial markets interests (Palley, 2007). This is done by making managers’ remunerations
dependent on corporations’ stock price evolution, and through the encouragement of debt.
This has negative implications for risk management since managers focus on the short run
behaviour of the share price and take excessive leverage. More generally, the rise of short-
termism is related with the growth of institutional investors, changes in governance
control, and the prominence of finance in the economy (Orhangazi, 2008: 74).
The increase in the share of profits in income (with the reverse decrease of the wages’
share) led to the arrival of a growing volume of capital on financial markets in search of
high returns. Faced with this pressure and abundant capital, banks paid less attention to
risk and were more concerned about obtaining high returns.
The need to increase profits in the short run led to the creation of complex mortgage
backed securities, without proper risk assessment, which ultimately gave rise to the crisis.
The fact that regulators trusted in the self-regulation and market discipline of financial
institutions also proved to be misguided as neither of the mechanisms were sufficient to
foster a sustainable approach to risk. Simultaneously, risk taking by financial institutions
increased systemic risk and volatility in the economy. Cultural aspects associated with ego,
greed and over-confidence in both markets and quantitative tools also play a part in
explaining the crisis.
We can therefore conclude that the shortcomings in risk management identified during the
subprime crisis should be interpreted by using the broad concept of financialisation as this
will foster the design of more effective regulations that prevent further crises.
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